In re the Exxon Valdez: The Danger of Deception in
a Novel Mary Carter Agreement
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INTRODUCTION

On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef
in Alaska's Prince William Sound, disgorging eleven million gallons of
North Slope crude' and causin2g the worst oil spill in American
history. 2 In fewer than five hours the spill devastated one of the
country's most sensitive ecosystems. 3 By August 1989, the oil had
spread over nearly ten thousand square miles, soiling more than twelve
hundred miles of shoreline.4
Following the spill, lawsuits for compensatory and punitive
damages were filed against Exxon' and Captain Joseph Hazelwood, the
skipper of the Exxon Valdez, by more than 32,000 people, including

fishermen, Alaska Natives, business operators, and landowners. 6

Similar lawsuits were also filed against Exxon and Captain Hazelwood
by seven Seattle-based seafood processors, known collectively as the

"Seattle Seven." 7

* B.A. 1991, University of Washington; J.D. Candidate 1998, Seattle University School of
Law. The author and her husband own a commercial fishing boat and permit in Port Moller,
Alaska, and are plaintiffs in the Exxon Valdez litigation. The author would like to thank
Professors David Boerner, Anne Enquist, Susan McClellan, Kellye Testy and Judge J. Dean
Morgan for their invaluable comments and suggestions.
1. See Mark Hansen, $15 Billion in Punitives Sought, If Exxon Sets Record, It's Unlikely to
Stand, ABA J., Sept. 1994, at 30.
2. See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees (corrected) at 3, In re Exxon Valdez, Nos. 96-36038, 9735036 (9th Cir. filed Apr. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Appellees' Brief] (on file with the Seattle
University Law Review).
3. See Christine Cartwright, NaturalResource Damage Assessment: The Exxon Valdez Oil
Spill and Its Implications, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 451, 451 (1991).
4. See id.
5. "Exxon" refers collectively to Exxon Corporation and Exxon Shipping Company.
6. See Declaration of Lead Counsel in Support of Motion For Award of Attorneys' Fees
and Reimbursement of Expenses at 9, In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095-CV (HRH) (D. Alaska
declaration filed Mar. 18, 1997) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review). For a definition
of "Alaska Natives," see Alaska Native Class v. Exxon, 104 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1997).
7. The Seattle Seven includes the following seafood processors and related entities: Icide
Seafoods, Inc.; Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc.; Seven Seas Corp.; Stellar Seafoods, Inc.; Ocean Beauty
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On January 8, 1991, two years after the spill and three years
before the beginning of the trial, Exxon and the Seattle Seven entered
into a comprehensive agreement, settling the lawsuits filed by the
Seattle Seven.'
Learning of the settlement, plaintiffs' 9 attorneys
requested information on the terms of the agreement." The Seattle
Seven's attorneys, however, declared that the terms of their agreement
were confidential and that they would not reveal them to the plaintiffs."
On April 15, 1994, U.S. District Judge H. Russel Holland, at
Exxon's request, consolidated all of the lawsuits into one mandatory
punitive damages class. 2 He then divided the trial into three
phases.' 3 In Phase I, the jury determined that Exxon and Captain
Hazelwood acted recklessly in allowing the Exxon Valdez to run

Seafoods, Inc.; Ocean Beauty Alaska, Inc.; Wards Cove Packing Co.; Alaska Boat Co.; North
Pacific Processors, Inc.; Aleutian Dragon Fisheries, Inc.; Trident Seafoods Corp.; and North
Coast Seafood Processors, Inc.
8. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum:' (A) In Response to Objection of Certain Seafood
Processors, on Behalf of Exxon, as Real Party in Interest, to Final Approval of Plan of Allocation;
and (B) In Response to Exxon's Motion Seeking Reduction of Phase III Verdict at 1-2, In re
Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095-CV (HRH) (D. Alaska memorandum filed Apr. 12, 1996)
[hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memorandum] (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
9. "Plaintiffs" include all individuals and business entities in the Exxon Valdez litigation
who were signatories to the "Joint Prosecution Agreement, And Damages Allocation Agreement."
See infra note 16. Nonsignatories included only a handful of institutional plaintiffs who refused
to participate in the Joint Prosecution Agreement and elected to take their chances in separate
trials. "Plaintiffs" do not include the Seattle Seven, who were not signatories and who settled
their claims against Exxon prior to trial. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion
of Plaintiffs and Defendants for Preliminary Approval of Phase IV Settlement, Plaintiffs' Motion
for Preliminary Approval of Plan of Allocation of Recoveries Obtained by Plaintiffs in Litigation
Arising from the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, and the Orders Requested in Those Motions Scheduling
a Hearing on Final Approval of the Phase IV Settlement and Plan of Allocation, and Authorizing
Notice to Class Members at 24, In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095-CV (HRH) (D. Alaska
memorandum filed Jan. 12, 1996) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Preliminary Approval of the Plan of Allocation] (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
10. See Declaration of David W. Oesting at 1, In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095-CV
(HRII) (D. Alaska declaration filed July 2, 1996) [hereinafter Oesting Declaration] (on file with
the Seattle University Law Review). Plaintiffs learned of the settlement after the Seattle Seven's
lawsuit had been dismissed on January 9, 1991. See Joint Opening Brief of Appellants, at 8, In
re Exxon Valdez, No. 96-36038, 97-35036 (9th Cir. filed Jan. 30, 1997) [hereinafter Appellants'
Brief] (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
11. See Oesting Declaration, supra note 10, at 1.
12. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 8, at 10. A mandatory punitive damages class
is a class from which no member can opt out. It was sought by Exxon to prevent the possibility
of multiple punitive damage awards. "At Exxon's request, the class was defined to include 'all
persons or entities who possess or have asserted claims for punitive damages against Exxon...
which arise from or relate in any way to the grounding of the Exxon Valdez or the resulting oil
spill."' Appellees' Brief, supra note 2, at 8.
13. See Appellees' Brief, supra note 2, at 8-11.
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aground in Prince William Sound, thus opening the door for plaintiffs
to claim punitive damages.14 In Phase II, the jury awarded the
plaintiffs $287 million in compensatory damages.15 And in Phase III,
the jury, determining that it was necessary to punish and deter Exxon,
awarded the plaintiffs $5 billion in punitive damages, the largest such
award in history.
Following the trial, plaintiffs' attorneys began the task of creating
a plan to allocate the judgment among the members of the mandatory
punitive damages class. 6 As part of this process, plaintiffs again
contacted the Seattle Seven's attorneys to determine whether they
planned to claim a portion of the punitive damages award. 7 Attorneys for the Seattle Seven responded that "[they] had released their
punitive damage claims when they settled with Exxon in 1991 and that
they did not believe the Seattle Seven were entitled to obtain any
In reliance on these
portion of the punitive damage award."'"
statements, the plaintiffs did not allocate punitive damages to the
Seattle Seven. 9
On January 12, 1996, plaintiffs sought approval of their Plan of
Allocation. 20 Despite earlier statements, however, attorneys for the
Seattle Seven filed a motion, objecting to the Plan of Allocation and
contending that fifteen percent of the punitive damages award should

14. See id. at 9.
15. See id. at 10-11.
16. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Plan
of Allocation, supra note 9, at 5-9. Prior to trial, plaintiffs entered into a "Joint Prosecution
Agreement, And Damages Allocation Agreement" whereby all plaintiffs would pool their
recoveries in the consolidated litigation and share them based on a devised plan of allocation.
This agreement enabled plaintiffs to proceed with an effective trial plan, "which subordinated the
interests of each group of plaintiffs to the collective interests of all." Id. at 9. The development
of the Plan of Allocation took more than two years of work by approximately 450 attorneys. Id.
at 3.

17. See id. at 8; Declaration of Charles L. Miller, Jr. at 42, In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89095-CV (HRH) (D. Alaska declaration filed Mar. 22, 1996) (on file with the Seattle University
Law Review); Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 8, at 15-16. In order to evaluate whether any
claim by the Seattle Seven should be included in the Plan of Allocation, plaintiffs would have to
review their agreement with Exxon.
18. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 8, at 16.
19. See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Plan
of Allocation, supra note 9, at 8.
20. See generally id. "The Plan of Allocation specifically noted that no punitive damages
are being allocated to the Seattle Seven, because 'these plaintiffs had previously settled and
released claims against the Exxon defendants, did not execute the joint prosecution agreement, and
as processors are subject to dismissal under the law of the case."' Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra
note 8,at 18.
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be allocated to them. 21 Their supporting documents made public for
the first time the terms of the two settlement agreements between
Exxon and the Seattle Seven. 2
These secret agreements required the Seattle Seven, in return for
a settlement of $70 million, to claim entitlement to allocated portions
of any punitive damages.23 According to the agreements, should the
Seattle Seven obtain any punitive damages, they would return the
damages to Exxon, thereby reducing Exxon's overall damages by what
turned out to be $745 million.24
While counsel for Exxon had revealed to the jury during Phase III
that Exxon had voluntarily paid damages to the processors, the jurors
were not told that Exxon, through the Seattle Seven, intended to reduce
its punitive damages by any amount awarded to the processors.25
What is more, Exxon had affirmatively represented that it had sought
nothing in return for its payments to the Seattle Seven. According to
the court, "Exxon asked the jury to consider for purposes of mitigation,
that Exxon paid $113,500,000 to seafood processors, including the
Seattle Seven ... and that in return Exxon asked for nothing more
than a receipt.""
The Seattle Seven's revelation outraged Judge Holland, who called
it an "astonishing ruse" and "deception" on the court and denied the
Seattle Seven (and Exxon) an allocation of any punitive damages.27
He stated that "the court had not identified any policy which rendered
the settlement agreements per se unenforceable; rather, it was the use
and in particular the misrepresentation of the substance of those
agreements to the court and jury that the court found to be contrary
to strong public policy."28 Judge Holland further asserted that the
court might have allowed the agreements had Exxon and the Seattle

21. Certain Seafood Processors Objections To and Memorandum Opposing Approval of
the Plan of Allocation, In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095-CV (HRH) (D. Alaska memorandum
filed Mar. 18, 1996) [hereinafter Seafood Processors' Objections to the Plan of Allocation] (on file
with the Seattle University Law Review). The Seattle Seven argued that it received 14.9% of the
compensatory damages awarded to plaintiffs and should, therefore, receive 14.9% of the punitive
damages, or $745 million. See Appellants' Brief, supra note 10, at 18.
22. Appellees' Brief, supra note 2, at 19.
23. See Order No. 327 at 3, In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095-CV (HRH) (D. Alaska
issued Sept. 11, 1996) (order denying Exxon's Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Final
Approval of the Plan of Allocation).
24. See id. at 9.

25. See Order No. 317 at 27, In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095-CV (HRH) (D. Alaska
issued June 11, 1996) (order granting final approval of the Plan of Allocation).
26. Id. at 28-29.
27. See id. at 29-31.
28. Order No. 327, supra note 23, at 7.
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Seven kept their agreement confidential, without any misrepresentation."
Judge Holland's opinion has sparked much debate over the ethics
and legality of the attempt by Exxon and the Seattle Seven to reduce
punitive damages. Legal ethicists and other experts agree, however,
that this "bold tactic was novel, saying they had never before come
across such an agreement.'30
This Note addresses the legality and ethics of the secret agreement
between Exxon and the Seattle Seven by analogy to a similar type of
collusive agreement, called a "Mary Carter" agreement.3 Part I of
this Note looks at the terms of the Exxon/Seattle Seven agreements.
Part II examines Judge Holland's controversial decision with respect to
the Exxon/Seattle Seven agreements. Part III describes the nature of
a Mary Carter agreement and the factors used to determine whether
such an agreement exists. Then Part IV argues that, like Mary Carter
agreements, the Exxon/Seattle Seven agreements undercut the jury
system, prolong litigation, contravene legal ethics, and run afoul of
public policy. Part IV further argues that, while Judge Holland's
ultimate conclusion was correct, he was wrong in stating that had there
been no misrepresentation the Exxon/Seattle Seven agreements would
have been valid. This Note concludes that secret assignment of
punitive damages, being even more egregious than Mary Carter
agreements, must be disclosed to the court.

I. THE EXXON/SEATTLE SEVEN AGREEMENTS
Exxon and the Seattle Seven entered into their first settlement
agreement early in the litigation. In exchange for $63.67 5 million, the
Seattle Seven surrendered all of their claims alleged in their 1989
complaint against Exxon, specifically including any claims to punitive
damages.32 The agreement provided that "by entering into this
Agreement [the Seattle Seven] and Exxon intend to compromise and

29. See id. at 11.
30. Charles McCoy and Peter Fritsch, Exxon Defends Its Novel Approach To Reducing
Valdez Punitive Damages, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1996, at B3.
31. The "Mary Carter" agreement draws its name from Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co.,
202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). See the text discussion of these agreements infra in Part
III.
32. See Appellees' Brief, supra note 2, at 5. The 1989 complaint included compensatory

and punitive damages for the years 1989 and 1990. In April 1994, the Seattle Seven filed a
second complaint seeking compensatory damages incurred after 1990. "Punitive damages, having
been settled in the 1991 Agreement, were not sought in the 1994 complaint." Id.
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settle all presently existing claims for actual damages and all claims
whatsoever for punitive damages."33
The primary purpose of the agreement was not to settle the claims
of the Seattle Seven, however, but instead "to achieve setoffs and
reductions, including setoffs and reductions to punitive damages. . . for
the benefit of Exxon." 34 The "centerpiece" 3 of the agreement
provided as follows:
4.b. As consideration for Exxon's Payments, [the Seattle Seven] agree
to take all reasonable, lawful and ethical (under the Rules of Professional Conduct) actions to assist Exxon so that Exxon may recapture
or obtain a credit or offset for any punitive damages, awards,
settlements, and claims against Exxon ... to which [the Seattle Seven]

may have been entitled. If Exxon requests, [the Seattle Seven] will
undertake to participate in any consolidated or class proceeding
against Exxon ... in which plaintiffs seek punitive damages, and

will assert [the Seattle Seven's] entitlement to allocated portions of
any punitive awards or settlements on the same basis as all other
plaintiffs to that action. [The Seattle Seven] also hereby assign...
to Exxon ...

any rights they may ultimately obtain to a punitive

damages award against Exxon. ... [the Seattle Seven's] and Exxon's
intent being that any such punitive damage proceeds to which [the
Seattle Seven] become entitled will inure to Exxon's . . . benefit....

If Exxon requests [the Seattle Seven] to take any of the actions
described in this Part 4.b., Exxon Corporation agrees to reimburse
[the Seattle Seven] for all reasonable costs and expenses and
attorneys' fees incurred in complying with Exxon's requests.36
Finally, the agreement included several provisions, which reflected
the parties' awareness of the questionable nature of the agreement.3 7

33. Order No. 317, supra note 25, at 19 (emphasis added). Despite this clear language
settling the Seattle Seven's compensatory and punitive damage daims, Exxon included a provision
which provided that "this agreement is not to be construed as a release of any parties. (Settlement
Agreement, 6)." Declaration of Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. at 6, In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095CV (HRH) (D. Alaska declaration filed July 2, 1996) [hereinafter Hazard Declaration] (on file
with the Seattle University Law Review).
34. Order No. 317, supra note 25, at 19.
35. Order No. 327, supra note 23, at 3.
36. Order No. 317, supra note 25, at 20-21 (emphasis added).
37. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 8, at 7. As Judge Holland observed, "even

Exxon and the Seattle Seven perceived at the outset the possibility that their agreement might be
unenforceable, and made specific provision that the overall agreement would survive even if the
scheme to remit punitive damages to Exxon were to fail." Order No. 327, supra note 23, at 8
n.12.
The provisions Judge Holland referred to state:
4.c. If any of the undertakings described in Part 4.b. of this Agreement are for any
reason judicially determined to be unenforceable, [the Seattle Seven] covenant not to
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The most significant of these provisions provided that "the terms of
the Agreement shall be deemed strictly confidential and shall not be
disclosed to any person or entity. '"38
At no time during the trial did Exxon reveal to the court or the
jury any of the provisions of its agreement with the Seattle Seven.39
In fact, during Phase III Exxon attempted to convince the jury that it
had been generous in paying the Seattle Seven and other plaintiffs over
$300 million and obtaining only "receipts. ' 40 Exxon asked the jury
to "consider this 'fact' as a mitigating factor in determining punitive
damages."'" Thus, the jury was told that Exxon had made settlement
payments totaling $113,500,000 to several processors including the
Seattle Seven. 42 Because of the secrecy of the agreements, however,
the jury was not told that any punitive damages it would assess would
automatically be reduced by fifteen percent through Exxon's agreement
with the Seattle Seven.43 Moreover, Exxon's Chairman of the Board,
Lee Raymond, told the jury that Exxon had made these settlement
payments without obtaining a single release.
Mr. Raymond: I said from New York, forget the release, just pay
the money, get a receipt that you paid the money and some day
we'll sort all this out in court. Here we are. But someday we'll sort
it out in court, because it isn't good to not pay the people.
Q: So you paid claims without getting a release from the person
you paid?
Mr. Raymond: Right."

execute on, or unless otherwise directed by Exxon, accept an allocated share of any oil
spill punitive damages award that [the Seattle Seven] may secure against Exxon....
9. Neither Exxon... nor [the Seattle Seven] shall assert or contend in any judicial or
nonjudicial context that this Agreement or any part of this Agreement is in any way
invalid, unenforceable, or unreasonable. In the event any provision or portion of this
Agreement is held or adjudicated to be invalid or unenforceable, all other provisions
shall remain in full force and effect and the parties shall be bound thereby. Order No.
317, supra note 25, at 21.
38. Order No. 317, supra note 25, at 21.
39. See Order No. 327, supra note 23, at 10-11.
40. See Appellees' Brief, supra note 2, at 12.
41. Id.
42. See Order No. 317, supra note 25, at 27.
43. See id.
44. Id. "On cross examination, Mr. Raymond clarified that the $300 million in payments
supposedly made 'without getting a release' included the payments to the Seattle Seven." Appellees'
Brief, supra note 2, at 13. The court stated in its order denying reconsideration that, while at least
one Exxon attorney knowingly misrepresented the Seattle Seven settlement agreements, the court
was willing to assume that Lee Raymond was honestly mistaken. Order No. 327, supra note 23,
at 7.
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In closing arguments, Exxon perpetuated this deception by
reiterating that it had paid over $300 million in claims to fishermen,
seafood processors, and others without asking for a single release.4"
But what Exxon had asked for was far greater than a release; it had
asked for the return of fifteen percent of any punitive damages.46
The settlement agreement thus contained a potentially enourmous
rebate from the Seattle Seven to Exxon.
On September 16, 1994, the jury returned its verdict, awarding
the plaintiffs $5 billion in punitive damages.47 On September 30,
1994, Exxon filed more than twenty motions with the court seeking to
change various aspects of the trial, and in particular the punitive
damages award.4" At no time, however, did Exxon attempt to rectify
the misrepresentation made in court or disclose any of the provisions
of its agreement with the Seattle Seven.49 On January 27, 1995,
Judge Holland denied Exxon's motions, upholding the punitive
damages award. 0
On January 11, 1996, Exxon and the Seattle Seven entered into a
second agreement to amend their 1991 agreement.51 The new
agreement carried forward all of the terms of the earlier agreement, and
added a financial incentive for the Seattle Seven should they be able to
persuade the court to allocate a portion of the punitive damages to
them.12 Specifically, the Seattle Seven would receive between $6
million and $20 million, based on a formula, for objecting to the Plan

45. See Order No. 317, supra note 25, at 28.
46. See id. at 29.
47. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 8, at 15.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id. "Still unaware of Exxon's plan, the court noted that the jury had been presented
with the evidence of settlements, and had been entitled to consider that evidence in mitigation."
Appellees' Brief, supra note 2, at 16.
51. See Order No. 317, supra note 25, at 22. Yet another agreement, entered on the same
day, settled the Seattle Seven's 1994 lawsuit for post-1990 compensatory damages. The 1996
Agreement provided:
I.f. By entering into this Agreement [the Seattle Seven] and Exxon intend to
compromise and settle all presently existing claims, whether asserted or not asserted and
whether known or unknown, for actual damages and all other claims whatsoever, if any,
arising out of the grounding of the Exxon Valdez....
VI. Not a Release
This agreement is not to be construed as a release of any parties to litigation
relating to the oil spill. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, nothing
in this agreement shall waive, reduce, diminish or in any manner limit [the Seattle
Seven's] status as members of the mandatory punitive damages class. ...
Order No. 317, supra note 25, at 22.
52. Id. at 24.
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of Allocation and asserting a claim to fifteen percent of the punitive
damages award.13 Exxon also agreed to pay all of the Seattle Seven's
attorneys' fees incurred in pursuing punitive damages.5 4
On March 18, 1996, the Seattle Seven objected to the Plan of
Allocation, and as described above, claimed entitlement to fifteen
percent of the punitive damages award." The Seattle Seven argued
that they specifically did not settle their punitive damages claims
them as directed in their 1991 and
because they had agreed to pursue
56
1996 agreements with Exxon.
II.

EXXON ORDERED TO PAY FOR ITS DECEPTION

Judge Holland unequivocally held that the Seattle Seven had
settled any and all claims against Exxon in their 1991 and 1996
agreements and, therefore, would not share in the allocation of the
punitive damages award. 7 Using strong language, Judge Holland
called the agreements "such pernicious and flagrant violations of public
policy as to render unenforceable their requirements that the Seattle
Seven seek punitive damages on behalf of Exxon.. . . [T]he provision
in the 1991 Agreement that its terms be kept strictly confidential is a
startling affront to the jury system."S The court continued, "Exxon
has acted as a Jekyll and Hyde, behaving laudably in public, and
deplorably in private. The court is shocked and disappointed that
Exxon entered into such an agreement."5 9 Specifically, the court held

53. See Appellants' Brief, supra note 10, at 9. Had they been successful, the Seattle Seven
would have received $12.4 million from Exxon for returning 14.9% of the punitive damage award,
but were guaranteed a minimum of $6 million if they failed. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra
note 8, at 17-18.
54. See Order No. 317, supra note 25, at 24.
55. See generally Seafood Processors' Objections to the Plan of Allocation, supra note 21.
56. See id. at 4.
57. Order No. 317 stated:
The Seattle Seven argue[d] that they settled compensatory damages only, but the 1991
and 1996 Agreements clearly settled all damages claims 'whatsoever.'
The Seattle Seven argue[d] that they did not release their punitive damages because
they agreed to pursue their punitive damage claims against Exxon. Yet the agreements
to pursue punitive damages against Exxon simply do not comport with the provisions
of the 1991 and 1994 [sic] Agreements which plainly settled all claims for punitive
damages. Having elected to settle their punitive damages claims against Exxon, the
Seattle Seven could not also perpetuate such claims for the purpose of taking a share of
punitive damages recovered by others--the class plaintiffs.
Order No. 317, supra note 25, at 26.
58. Id. at 26.
59. Id. at 30.
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that Exxon would not share in the punitive award because of Exxon's
deception and misrepresentation in court through Mr. Raymond.60
Despite the fact that Exxon and the Seattle Seven perceived that
their agreements might be deemed unenforceable, 6 they objected to
the court's opinion, filing a Motion to Reconsider Order No. 317.62
Exxon stated, "We are disturbed not so much by the ultimate result
stated in Order No. 317 (although we think the Court's conclusion is
erroneous) as by the Court's observations suggesting that the Settlement Agreement was against 6public
policy, and/or that improper or
3
unethical conduct took place.

Exxon's motion was supported by declarations from eight

prominent lawyers and judges.64 Despite the lawyers' eminence in the
field, "the declarations focused primarily and in generally abstract

60. Id. at 29.
The secretive nature of the agreement is not the problem here, the problem is that the
jury, plaintiffs, and the court were purposely misled about the settlement. Exxon set
a trap in the court room, and intended to spring it at the time damages were allocated,
but the court simply will not allow Exxon's ploy to alter the jury's verdict.
Appellees' Brief, supra note 2, at 21.
61. See Order No. 327, supra note 23, at 8 n.12. The parties added specific provisions to
the agreements in order to keep them in force should Exxon's scheme to rebate punitive damages
fail. See supranote 37.
62. Motion of Defendants Exxon Corporation and Exxon Shipping Company to Reconsider
Order No. 317, In reExxon Valdez, No. A89-095-CV (HRH) (D. Alaska motion filed June 18,
1996) [hereinafter Defendants' Motion to Reconsider Order No. 317] (on file with the Seattle
University Law Review); Joinder of Seafood Processors in the Exxon Defendants' Motion to
Reconsider Order No. 317, In reExxon Valdez, No. A89-095-CV (HRH) (D. Alaska motion filed
June 18, 1996) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
63. Memorandum In Support of Motion of Defendants Exxon Corporation and Exxon
Shipping Company to Reconsider Order No. 317 at 1,In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095-CV
(HRH) (D. Alaska memorandum filed June 18, 1996) [hereinafter Defendants' Memorandum]
(on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
64. Appellants' Brief, supra note 10, at 19-20. The eight were:
" Arlin M. Adams, formerly Judge of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit;
" Griffin B. Bell, formerly Attorney General of the United States and Judge of the U. S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit;
" A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Public Service Professor of Jurisprudence at Harvard University,
formerly Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit;
" Shirley M. Hufstedler, formerly Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
and U.S. Secretary of Education;
" Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, formerly chief counsel for IBM and Attorney General of the
United States;
" Daniel A. Moore, Jr., formerly Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Alaska;
" William H. Webster, formerly Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
Director of Central Intelligence, and Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
• Charles W. Wolfram, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, and Chief Reporter for the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers.
(Declarations on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
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terms on the public policy favoring confidentiality of settlements, and
largely ignored the particular circumstance of this case, including most
notably the fact that the Exxon/Seattle Seven settlement had been
disclosed but misrepresented.""5
In the court's Order denying Exxon's Motion to Reconsider,
Judge Holland modified his earlier opinion.6 6 While the court
continued to "doubt the propriety of rebating punitive damages as
contemplated by the agreements,. .. the focus of the court's attention
... [was] the manner in which Exxon used those agreements. "67
Judge Holland stated that "the court and jury were led to believe, by
Exxon witnesses and counsel, that the Seattle Seven were paid $70
million in compensatory damages and left to pursue punitive damages
against Exxon. That was not true. '68 Standing by his earlier opinion
that what took place was pernicious,69 Judge Holland found the
agreements to
misrepresentation of the Exxon/Seattle Seven settlement
70
be "highly injurious to the civil justice system.
Despite Judge Holland's concern over the use and misrepresentation of the agreements, he stated that "the court might [have] agree[d]
with Exxon and its affiants, had Exxon succeeded in keeping the
Seattle Seven settlement agreements entirely confidential."'" While
Judge Holland arrived at the correct conclusion in denying the Seattle
Seven and Exxon a share in the punitive damages award, this statement
undermines his own objections raised earlier in the proceedings. By
adding this line, Judge Holland has clouded rather than clarified the
issue of whether secret assignments of punitive damages are legal or
ethical, and in doing so has encouraged rather than discouraged similar
types of secret settlement agreements.
III.

MARY CARTER AGREEMENTS

At the core of the argument concerning the legality of the
Exxon/Seattle Seven agreements lies the issue of whether such an
arrangement constitutes a Mary Carter agreement. The term "Mary
Carter" agreement arises from the settlement pact in the Florida

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Appellees' Brief, supra note 2, at 22.
Order No. 327, supra note 23, at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 6.

Id.
Order No. 327, supra note 23, at 11.
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collision case, Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co. 7 2 A Mary Carter
agreement is a partial settlement between some, but not all, of the
parties involved in a multiparty litigation." Such agreements have
been defined in a number of ways, but generally exist when "the
settling defendant possesses a financial stake in the outcome of the case
74
and the settling defendant remains a party to the litigation."
Accordingly, parties that were once on opposite sides of the litigation
secretly agree to cooperate to the detriment of the other parties.7"
While Mary Carter agreements are most often characterized as a
settlement between the plaintiff and some, but not all, of the defendants in a trial, the number of variations of these agreements "is
limited only by the ingenuity of counsel and the willingness of the
parties to sign .... "76
Three factors are generally present in a Mary Carter agreement.
First, the settling party agrees to remain a party to the litigation."
Second, the settling party retains a financial stake in the outcome of the

72. Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). In Booth v.
Mary CarterPaint Co., the plaintiffs husband brought a wrongful death action against the drivers
and owners of three trucks that were stopped blocking a highway late at night, thereby causing
his wife's death when she collided with them. Two of the three defendants subsequently settled
with the plaintiff, agreeing to defend themselves in court and to testify against the nonsettling
defendants in exchange for reducing their own maximum liability. Additionally, the agreement
required that the settling defendants keep the terms of their agreement secret. Although the
Florida Court of Appeals upheld the agreement, the Florida Supreme Court overruled Booth in
Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973), holding that such secret settlements "mislead judges
and juries, and border on collusion. [And] to prevent such deception... such agreements must
be produced for examination before trial." Ward at 387. In 1993, however, the Florida Supreme
Court, finding the Ward disclosure policy insufficient, declared that all Mary Carter agreements
are void as against public policy. Dosdourian v. Carsten, 624 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1993).
These agreements are sometimes also referred to as "Gallagher" agreements, see, e.g., City
of Tucson v. Gallagher, 493 P.2d 1197 (Ariz. 1972); loan receipt agreements, see, e.g., Bohna v.
Hughes, 828 P.2d 745, 756 (Alaska 1992); sliding scale settlements, see, e.g., Abbott Ford, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 741 P.2d 124, 149 (Cal. 1987); and guaranteed verdict agreements, see, e.g.,
Bedford School District v. Union Pacific R.R., 367 A.2d 1051, 1052 (N.H. 1976).
73. See David Jonathan Grant, The Mary Carter Agreement - Solving the Problems of
Collusive Settlements in Joint Tort Actions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1974).
74. Elabor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 247 n.13 (Tex. 1992) (quoting Ward v. Ochoa, 284
So. 2d at 387).
75. See John E. Benedict, Note, It's a Mistake to Tolerate the Mary CarterAgreement, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 368, 371-372 (1987).
76. Maule Industries v. Rountree, 264 So. 2d 445, 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 284 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1973).
77. See, e.g., Elabor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d at 247. "A Mary Carter Agreement does not
have to expressly state that the settling defendant must participate in the trial. The participation
requirement is satisfied by the mere presence of the settling defendant as a party in the case."
Id. at 247 n.14.
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trial.78 Third, the parties agree to keep their agreement confiden79
tial.
In a conventional settlement, the defendant pays the plaintiff a
negotiated sum and in return the plaintiff executes a "release,"
discharging his claim against the defendant."0 If the action has
already begun, the settling party is dismissed from the lawsuit, leaving
the remaining parties and claims to be judged on the merits.8 '
By contrast, in a Mary Carter agreement the settling defendant
promises to remain a party to the lawsuit and work with the plaintiff
to seek a judgment against the nonsettling defendant.82 The settling
defendant guarantees the plaintiff a minimum recovery," and, as
incentive, if there is a judgment against the nonsettling defendant,
some or all of the guarantee will be rebated to the settling defendant,
who may ultimately pay nothing. 4 However, in a Mary Carter
agreement without a formal rebate provision, the settling defendant
agrees merely to remain in the lawsuit to prejudice the nonsettling
defendant.8" Regardless of which Mary Carter agreement is used, the
terms of the agreement are kept strictly confidential.8 6 As the court
held in Ward v. Ochoa, "[S]ecrecy is the essence of such an arrangement, because the court or jury as trier of the facts, if apprised of this,
the testimony and conduct of the
would likely weigh differently
8 s7
[settling] defendant.

78. See, e.g., id. at 247. Typically, "the settling defendant, who remains a party, guarantees
the plaintiff a minimum payment, which may [or may not] be offset in whole or in part by an
excess judgment recovered at trial." Id.
79. See, e.g., Dosdourian v. Carsten, 624 So. 2d at 243.
80. See Benedict, supra note 75, at 371.
81. See id.
82. See Dosdourian, 624 So. 2d at 243-244. Unique to the Mary Carter agreement, the
settling defendant remains a party in the lawsuit and continues to defend his case in court.
Because of the economic incentive of the agreement, the settling defendant now uses his ability
to participate at trial, bring witnesses, cross-examine witnesses, and argue to the jury to the
advantage of the plaintiff. Id.
83. See Grant, supra note 73, at 1397.
84. See Elabor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d at 247.
85. See Dosdourian, 624 So. 2d at 246.
86. See Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d at 387.
87. Id.
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Pros and Cons of Mary CarterAgreements

Mary Carter agreements have been described as "unethical
collusion[s],"88 "settlement viruses, ' 89 "unholy alliances,"90 and
"contractual monstrosit[ies]." '9 1 "They have also been criticized on
the grounds that they are unethical and amount to champerty, barratry
and maintenance."9 2 In effect they can distort the trial process,
mislead the jury, encourage unethical collusion among opposing parties,
and promote further litigation.93
Since 1967, some twenty-eight state courts have considered the
legality and ethics of Mary Carter agreements, finding their secrecy to
be the most compelling reason for judicial disapproval.9 4 Because of
the secrecy, parties to the agreement enjoy a number of tactical and
procedural advantages. For example, parties can share documents and
information about the case, 95 share peremptory challenges in order to
obtain a favorable jury," support each other's motions and vehemently challenge the nonsettling party's motions,9 7 lead witnesses on
examination and cross-examination,9" and abandon defenses earlier
asserted in the pleadings.9 9
While the court and jury usually presume that parties and their
counsel are motivated by their own interests, that presumption is no
longer valid when parties secretly agree otherwise prior to trial.100 As
a result, courts and juries are deceived, not only by the presentation of
88. Elabor, 845 S.W.2d at 250.
89. Harold Brown, "Mary Carter" Deals: A Settlement Virus, MASS. L. WKLY, Feb. 1,
1993, at 11.
90. Larry Bodine, The Case Against Guaranteed Verdict Agreements, 29 DEF. L. J. 233
(1980).
91. Warren Freedman, The Expected Demise of "Mary Carter": She Never Was Well!, 633
INS. L. J. 602, 603 (1975).
92. Lisa Bernstein and Daniel Klerman, An Economic Analysis of Mary CarterAgreements,
83 GEO. L. J. 2215, 2216-17 (1995). "Maintenance generally refers to an arrangement in which
one person agrees to support another in bringing or defending a legal action." Susan Lorde
Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New Business Opportunity?,30 AM. BUS. L. J.
485, 485 (1992). "Champerty is a kind of maintenance in which the investor receives a share of
the proceeds of the lawsuit in exchange for financing the legal action." Id. Barratry is the offense
of stirring up or inciting quarrels and lawsuits. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 103 (6th ed. 1991).
93. See Elabor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d at 250.
94. See, e.g., Cox v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 594 P.2d 354 (Okla. 1978).
95. See, e.g., Mustang Equipment Inc. v. Welch, 564 P.2d 895, 897 (Ariz. 1977).
96. See, e.g., Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. Perez, 591 S.W.2d 907, 920-22 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979).
97. See, e.g., Ratterree v. Bartlett, 707 P.2d 1063, 1075 (Kan. 1985).
98. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 410 A.2d 1039, 1044-45 (Md. 1980).
99. See, e.g., Ponderosa Timber & Clearing Co. v. Emrich, 472 P.2d 358, 362-64 (Nev.
1970).
100. See Dosdourian v. Carsten, 624 So. 2d at 243.
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distorted facts and evidence, but also by being led to believe that they
are resolving an existing dispute that has already been resolved.''
As the court held in Dosdourian v. Carsten, "This undermines the
integrity of the jury system which exists to fairly resolve actual
disputes between our citizens."'0 2
As a result of Mary Carter agreements, lawyers are forced into
questionable ethical situations that require them to violate both the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.0 3 In carrying out the objectives of the
agreement, lawyers must necessarily make misrepresentations to the
court and jury "in order to maintain the charade of an adversarial
relationship."'0 Such actions fly in the face of legal ethics concerned
with representing conflicting interests, ensuring candor and fairness,
taking technical advantage of opposing counsel, and pursuing unjustified litigation.' °s
The main argument in support of Mary Carter agreements is that
they promote settlement of lawsuits. Public policy favors settlement
because it lessens the expense and uncertainty of litigation and reduces
court congestion.106 While the law does favor settlement, Mary
Carter agreements achieve only partial settlement and by design require
a trial against the nonsettling party.' 7 Additionally, Mary Carter
agreements prevent settlement with the nonsettling party because, in
order to accomplish the goal of the agreement, litigation must be
pursued.' 8 Thus, the benefits of settlement are not realized.
B. The Majority Position
Despite the widespread criticism of Mary Carter agreements, the
majority ofjurisdictions have decided to tolerate them, but they require
disclosure of the agreements to the court and usually to the jury in
101.
102.
103.
104.
influence

See id.
Id.
See Elabor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d at 250.
Dosdourian, 624 So. 2d at 244 (finding that the settling parties ability to retain
over the outcome of the lawsuit and the adversarial process promotes unethical

practices). See also Daniel v. Penrod Drilling, Co., 393 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. La. 1975)
(determining that deceptive trial tactics were outside the boundaries of ethical conduct).
105. Lurn v. Stinett, 488 P.2d 347 (Nev. 1971); Benedict, supra note 75, at 378. See also
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canons 1, 7, 9 (1981); MODEL CODE OF

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1 (1984).
106. See Patricia M. Morrow, Is Mary CarterAlive and Well in Michigan?: Taking a Stand
on Secret Agreements in Multi-Party Tort Litigation, 2 DET. C.L. REV. 590, 625 (1985).
107. See Elabor, 845 S.W.2d at 248.
108. See David R. Miller, Mary CarterAgreements: Unfair and Unnecessary, 32 SW. L.J.
779, 786 (1978).
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order to overcome their secrecy."° Additional guidelines can require
judicial supervision and may mandate that Mary Carter agreements be
In Elabor v. Smith, the trial court additionally
discoverable."'
provided the nonsettling defendant the same number of peremptory
challenges as the settling defendant and plaintiff combined, denied the
settling parties the customary right of an opponent to lead each other's
witnesses, and reversed the order of presentation to guarantee that the
nonsettling defendant always had the final opportunity to present
evidence and examine witnesses."' By implementing procedural
safeguards and requiring mandatory disclosure of such settlements,
courts are satisfied that the nonsettling parties will not be unfairly
disadvantaged." 2
C.

The Minority Position

A minority of jurisdictions, however, have found such prophylactic measures unsatisfactory and have declared Mary Carter agreements
void as against public policy' 3 These jurisdictions hold that Mary
Carter agreements are "inimical to the adversary system and they do
not promote settlement-their primary justification.""' 4 Instead,
such agreements pressure the settling party "to alter the character of
the suit by contributing discovery material, peremptory challenges, trial
tactics, supportive witness examination, and jury influence to the

109. See, e.g., Hoops v. Watermelon City Trucking, Inc., 846 F.2d 637, 641 (10th Cir.
1988) ("Mary Carter agreements must be revealed to all parties and the court prior to trial and
to the jury in some appropriate degree to be decided by the trial court"); Wilkins v. P.M.B.
Systems Engineering, Inc., 741 F.2d 795, 798 n.2 (5th Cir. 1984) ("because of the inherent power
of a trial court to enforce settlement agreements reached in cases pending before it, and to
determine the validity of such agreements, it is important that the trial court retain a significant
degree of discretion in approving and enforcing Mary Carter agreements, as well as in disclosing
their terms to the jury").
110. Oklahoma has adopted a unique approach to dealing with Mary Carter agreements.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Cox v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., required trial courts, on discovering
such an agreement, either to dismiss the settling party prior to trial or to prohibit the portion of
the agreement granting an interest in the recovery. Cox v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 594 P.2d at 359.
"The [Oklahoma] court reasoned that if the settling [party] is dismissed and subsequently appears
as a witness, cross-examination regarding the [party's] interests and credibility will sufficiently
protect the nonsettling [party's] interests." J. Michael Phillips, Comment, Looking Out For Mary
Carter: Collusive Settlement Agreements in Washington Tort Litigation, 69 WASH. L. REV. 255,
261 (1994). Alternatively, if the settling party is prevented from acquiring a financial stake in the
outcome, the adversarial nature of the proceedings will be preserved. See Cox, 594 P.2d at 359360.
111. Elabor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d at 255.
112. See id. at 248.
113. See, e.g., Dosdourian v. Carsten, 624 So. 2d at 245; Lum v. Stinnett, 488 P.2d at 351;
Trampe v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 252 N.W. 675, 677-78 (Wis. 1934).
114. Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. 1986).

1997]

In re the Exxon Valdez

[opposing side]." ' ' Even with mandatory disclosure, such a change
in the adversarial nature of the parties could confound a jury charged
with determining the liability and damages of the parties." 6 Additionally, a jury could be influenced by the fact that a settlement has
been reached and by the behavior of the attorneys for the settling
parties. The minority is convinced that "the only effective way to
eliminate the7 sinister influence of Mary Carter agreements is to outlaw
1
their use.'1
D. Alaska's and Washington's Positions on Mary Carter Agreements
The Alaska and Washington courts have both indicated leanings
toward the majority view. While the Alaska court has not had the
opportunity to address directly the validity of Mary Carter agreements,
it has determined that the use of a loan receipt agreement,' a close
cousin to Mary Carter, is a valid settlement device provided it is
disclosed to the jury."9 The Alaska court held that the nonsettling
party's concerns over the collusive nature of the agreement "were
adequately met by allowing the [nonsettling party] to disclose the
realignment of interests to the jury and by letting the jury evaluate the
witnesses' credibility."' 20 Citing an earlier opinion, the court additionally noted that "juries should be informed when settlements change
the normal interests of parties."''
Washington's consideration of Mary Carter agreements has
likewise been extremely limited. Only one post-tort reform case,
McCluskey v. Handorff-Sherman, even mentions Mary Carter agreements.' 2 The court in McCluskey, however, did not reach the
115. Elabor, 845 S.W.2d at 249.
116. See Benedict, supra note 75, at 383.
117. Dosdourian, 624 So. 2d at 246.
118. "A loan receipt agreement is essentially the same as a Mary Carter agreement with one
significant difference: the settling defendant actually transfers money to the plaintiff at the time
of the agreement. This transfer is considered a 'loan' and is repayable if and to the extent that
the plaintiff wins a judgment against the nonsettling defendants." Jerold S. Solovoy et al.,
Settlement of Complex Civil Cases, 584 PRAC. L. INST. 393, 477 (1987).
119. See Bohna v. Hughes, 828 P.2d at 757.
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing Breitkreutz v. Baker, 514 P.2d 17, 29 n.30 (Alaska 1973)).
122. McCluskey v. Handorff-Sherman, 841 P.2d 1300 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). In
McCluskey, the sixteen-year-old defendant driver was on his way home, accompanied by a few
of his friends with whom he had shared some marijuana. It was raining hard and had begun to
snow. While the defendant was stopped at a red light, he decided to pass the car ahead of him
after the light turned green. As he pulled around the car on the right and started to accelerate,
he began heading down hill toward a "dip" in the road where water had accumulated. As he hit
the dip and accumulated water, his tires lost traction and his car slid across the median into
oncoming traffic. The defendant's car slammed into Mr. McCluskey's car, forcing it down an
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validity of Mary Carter agreements because the defendant State did not
establish that any such agreement existed. 12 3 Nevertheless, the court
stated in dicta that "the existence of an undisclosed agreement between
outwardly adversarial parties at trial can prejudice the proceedings by
misleading the trier of fact.' 1 24 The court indicated that only
through pre-trial disclosure of the agreement to12the court and jury can
the credibility of witnesses be fairly evaluated.
IV. A NOVEL MARY CARTER AGREEMENT
Although plaintiffs and their affiants argued that the
Exxon/Seattle Seven agreements were a "form" of Mary Carter
agreement, 2 6 Judge Holland held that they were not because they did
not fall within the traditional Mary Carter definition. 127 The remainder of this article will argue, however, that the Exxon/Seattle Seven
agreements are a novel form of Mary Carter agreement and that,
despite their novelty, they are functionally similar to a Mary Carter
agreement. Furthermore, such agreements are even more reprehensible
than traditional Mary Carter agreements because they require that
parties not only act secretly and to the detriment of plaintiffs, but also

embankment and throwing Mr. McCluskey from the car. Mr. McCluskey died at the scene.
Mrs. McCluskey filed a wrongful death suit against Handorff-Sherman for negligently
operating his vehicle and the State of Washington for maintaining a hazardous and unsafe
roadway. A jury found the defendant driver and the State of Washington each fifty percent
liable.
On appeal, the State moved for a new trial, arguing that the indigent, insuranceless defendant
had secretly worked together with the plaintiff to obtain a verdict against the State, "the defendant
with the deep pocket." Id. at 1304. In support of its contention, the State pointed to the
defendant's failure to object to plaintiff's motions in limine, to defendant's agreement with
plaintiff as to jury selection, and to defendant's and plaintiffs targeting of the State as the
responsible party while reducing the liability of the defendant driver. Id. at 1304. Although the
court agreed that the two parties were in "unusual synchronization," without evidence of some
kind of agreement there was no basis for a new trial. Id. at 1305.
123. See id. at 1305.
124. Id. at 1304.
125. See id.
126. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 8, at 39; Hazard Declaration, supra note 33,
at 10.
127. Order No. 317, supra note 25, at 30 n.42. Judge Holland did not elaborate as to why
he believed the Exxon/Seattle Seven agreement was not a Mary Carter agreement, other than by
citing to the Ward v. Ochoa traditional definition. "A Mary Carter agreement is a contract by
which one co-defendant secretly agrees with the plaintiff that, if such defendant will proceed to
defend himself in court, his own maximum liability will be diminished proportionately by
increasing the liability of other co-defendants." Id. (citing Ward, 284 So. 2d at 387). If Judge
Holland did not recognize the Exxon/Seattle Seven agreement as a Mary Carter agreement by
definition, however, he did find the Exxon/Seattle Seven agreement "even more reprehensible."
Order No. 317, supra note 25, at 30 n.42. See also Order No. 327, supra note 23, at 8 n.13.
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mislead the court and, most egregiously, the jury. 2 ' To prevent this
type of deception in the future, such novel Mary Carter agreements
must be disclosed to the court.
A.

The Exxon/Seattle Seven Agreements are Equivalent to a Mary
CarterAgreement

Although the Exxon Valdez case did not involve one plaintiff and
multiple defendants, all of the Mary Carter factors are present in the
Exxon/Seattle Seven agreements. First, the Seattle Seven remained a
party to the lawsuit. Second, Exxon and the Seattle Seven agreed that
the terms of their agreement would be kept confidential. And third,
the Seattle Seven acquired a financial stake in the outcome of the trial
by virtue of the $70 million payment and the performance bonus for
objecting to the Plan of Allocation and recovering possible punitive
damages. 2 9
In addition to satisfying the Mary Carter factors, the
Exxon/Seattle Seven agreements caused the same kind of procedural
and substantive damage that Mary Carter agreements cause. 30 By
keeping secret its agreement with the Seattle Seven, Exxon was able to
deceive the court and jury by testifying that it had obtained only
receipts from the Seattle Seven and not the surrender of rights. 3' Its
objective in misrepresenting the Seattle Seven agreement was to have
the jury assess punitive damages without the benefit of knowing that
Exxon intended to recoup a portion of whatever amount the jury
assessed. 32 Had the jury been aware of Exxon's scheme to recoup
nearly fifteen percent of the punitive damages award, the jury may well
have increased the punitive damages by fifteen percent. 3 Thus as
Judge Holland noted, "Exxon sought to reduce its exposure to punitive
damages twice: once by informing the jury of its voluntary payments
to the seafood processors, and a second time through its secret

128. See Order No. 327, supra note 23, at 30 n.42.
129. Though the performance bonus was not added until the 1996 amendment, it is
sufficient for a "financial stake" that the Seattle Seven received the $70 million payment. See,
e.g., Benedict, supra note 75, at 371 n.14 (stating that "even without a formal rebate provision,"

the financial factor is met when the defendant guarantees the plaintiff afixed payment, "regardless
of the court's judgment"); Elabor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d at 247; Dosdourian v. Carsten, 624 So.
2d at 246 (prohibiting "any agreement which requires the settling defendant to remain in
litigation, regardless of whether there is a financial incentive to do so").
130. Cf. Elabor,845 S.W.2d at 250.
131. See Order No. 317, supra note 25, at 29.
132. See id. at 28.
133. See id. at 29.
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agreement with the Seattle Seven."'" Having failed to disclose the
agreement before trial, Exxon succeeded in perpetrating a fraud on the
court, and nearly received fifteen percent of the punitive damages
award.

135

Exxon and its affiants, however, disputed the assertion that its
agreements with the Seattle Seven were analogous to a Mary Carter
agreement. 1 6 They argued that, unlike a Mary Carter agreement,
the Exxon/Seattle Seven agreements neither changed the adversarial
relationship of the parties nor obligated the Seattle Seven to participate
in the punitive damages phase of the trial.' 37
Contrary to Exxon's argument, however, the agreement did alter
the adversarial relationship between Exxon and the Seattle Seven by
requiring that the Seattle Seven pursue punitive damages on behalf of
Exxon. Although the Seattle Seven did not participate in the punitive
damages phase of the trial, Exxon used its new alliance with the Seattle
Seven to mislead the court and the jury.
As Professor Geoffrey Hazard argued, "[the Seattle Seven's]
participation in the arrangement made them accomplices to the
deception of the court."'3 8 What is more, the Seattle Seven demonstrated its alliance with Exxon by objecting to the Plan of Allocation
and claiming fifteen percent of the punitive damages award on Exxon's
behalf. Without this alliance, Exxon would have been unable to
pursue its scheme to rebate punitive damages.
Furthermore, as the court pointed out in Elabor v. Smith,
participation at trial is not a requisite of a Mary Carter agreement. As
previously noted, "the participation requirement is satisfied by the
1 39
mere presence of the settling [plaintiff] as a party in the case."'

134. Id.
135. See id. at 30 ("Although the court does not so find, it is probable that more than one
of the many attorneys who represent Exxon and the Seattle Seven violated Rule 3.3 of the Alaska
Rules of Professional Conduct requiring candor toward the tribunal"). Judge Holland stopped
short of finding violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, but left open the possibility for
formal sanctions at a later date, including sanctions to the Alaska Bar Association. See Stanley
Holmes, Exxon, Fish Processors'Secret Deal Backfires-Oil Giant Would Have Gotten Partof Spill
Money, SEATTLE TIMEs, July 1, 1996, at Al.
136. Reply Memorandum of Defendants Exxon Corporation and Exxon Shipping Company
in Support of Motion to Reconsider Order No. 317 at 12, In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095-CV
(HRH) (D. Alaska memorandum filed July 15, 1996) [hereinafter Defendants' Reply
Memorandum] (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
137. Id.
138. Hazard Declaration, supra note 33, at 12. This comment is not meant to infer that the
Seattle Seven took part in the misrepresentation in court, only that their participation in the
agreement altered the character of the lawsuit.
139. Elabor v. Smith 845 S.W.2d at 247 n.14.
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Even if the settling defendant does not participate in the trial, the court
and jury are still misled as to the actual relationship among the settling
parties by the presence of the settling defendant as a party in the
Therefore, it is enough that the Seattle Seven seafood
case. 140
processors maintained their status as plaintiffs in the mandatory
punitive damages class.
Exxon additionally argued that, unlike a Mary Carter agreement,
the 1991 agreement did not provide any financial incentive for the
Seattle Seven to assist Exxon. 14' However, even though the Seattle
Seven did not receive the incentive bonus to pursue punitive damages
until after the punitive damages phase of the trial, the Seattle Seven
still had a financial incentive because they had received the $70 million
settlement payment. 142 In any event, the $70 million settlement
provided considerable incentive and security for the Seattle Seven at a
time when it was unclear whether there would be a punitive damages
recovery, and whether that recovery would include the Seattle
Seven. 143 Once the Seattle Seven entered into the agreement with
Exxon, they were bound by its terms to pursue punitive damages on
behalf of Exxon, with or without a financial incentive. Additionally,
it should be noted that the Seattle Seven did not object to the Plan of
Allocation until after they had amended their agreement with Exxon
in 1996. The amended agreement added a minimum $6 million
incentive bonus.
Finally, Exxon's affiants argued that the Exxon/Seattle Seven
agreements could not be analogous to a Mary Carter agreement
because they did not oblige the signatories to "gang up on" or harm
the nonsettling parties.'4 4 Like the nonsettling party in Mary Carter
agreements, however, the plaintiffs in the Exxon case were significantly
harmed by the Exxon/Seattle Seven agreements.
As a result of the secret agreement, plaintiffs were deceived by the
misrepresentation of evidence during the punitive damages phase of the
trial. Had plaintiffs been aware of the Exxon/Seattle Seven agreements
at the time of trial, they could have addressed the issue, both in cross
140. See id.
141. See Defendants' Reply Memorandum, supra note 136, at 12.
142. See, e.g., Benedict, supra note 75, at 372 n.14.
143. See Seafood Processors' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration
Regarding Order No. 317, at 4, In re Exxon Valdez No. A89-095-CV (HRH) (D. Alaska
memorandum filed July 17, 1996) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
144. See Declaration of Shirley M. Hufstedler at 9, In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095-CV
(HRH) (D. Alaska declaration filed July 23, 1996); Declaration of William H. Webster at 5, In
re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095-CV (HRH) (D. Alaska declaration filed July 15, 1996) [hereinafter
Webster Declaration] (both on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
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examination of Mr. Raymond and in closing argument. 14 ' Furthermore, the Seattle Seven's objections and Exxon's motions prolonged the
litigation, causing undue delay in the conclusion of the trial and
increasing legal expenses for plaintiffs and the federal court system.
Moreover, Exxon and the Seattle Seven intend to prolong the litigation
further by pressing the issue on appeal.146
1. The Exxon/Seattle Seven Agreements Contravene Legal Ethics
After considering the agreements between Exxon and the Seattle
Seven, and after considering what the court and jury knew about those
agreements, Judge Holland concluded that the Exxon/Seattle Seven
agreements should not be enforced. He further concluded that a
violation of the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct had likely
occurred.' 47 Judge Holland stated that it was probable that more
than one Exxon attorney violated Rule 3.3, which requires candor
toward the tribunal, by misrepresenting the substance of those
agreements to the court and jury.148
Rule 3.3 is one of the few rules in the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct that places an affirmative duty on the attorney to prevent the
court from being deceived.' 49 The comment to Rule 3.3 suggests
that a lawyer may make a statement in open court only "when the
lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis
of a reasonably diligent inquiry. '"'s° Additionally, Rule 3.3 requires

145. See Declaration of Brian O'Neill at 2, In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095-CV (HRH)
(D. Alaska declaration filed July 2, 1996) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
146. See generally Appellants' Brief, supra note 10.
147. Order No. 327, supra note 23, at 2.
148. Order No. 317, supra note 25, at 30. Rule 3.3, Candor Toward the Tribunal, provides
in relevant part:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client; .. .or
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered
material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures.

(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and
apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by rule
1.6. (Confidentiality of Information)
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].

149. See Jill M. Dennis, Note, The Model Rules and the Searchfor Truth: The Origins and
Applications of Model Rule 3.3(d), 8 GEO. J. LEGAL, ETHics 157, 158 (1994).
150. MODEL RULES, supra note 148, Rule 3.3, comment (2).
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that a lawyer take remedial measures should the lawyer later learn that
any of the evidence presented was false.'
In the Exxon case, both Mr. Raymond and Exxon's trial counsel
made false and misleading statements to the court in violation of Rule
3.3."2 Their testimony and argument was to the effect that Exxon
voluntarily paid $113.5 million to the Seattle Seven and others,
receiving only receipts in return. Exxon's statements, however, were
false. In truth, Exxon sought to receive far more than receipts. It
sought the return of fifteen percent of the punitive damages award.
While Judge Holland did not specifically rule on the violations of
professional conduct, he did twice find that Exxon intentionally and
affirmatively misled the court, the jury, and the plaintiffs with regard
to the terms of the Seattle Seven agreement.' 53
Writing for plaintiffs, Professor Hazard argued that Rules 1.2(d)
and 8.4 of the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct were also
violated.'54 Rule 1.2(d) prohibits a lawyer from counseling a client
Rule 8.4 states,
to engage, or assisting a client to engage, in fraud.'
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: ... (c) engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; [or]
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.""'
Professor Hazard's rationale was essentially similar to Judge
Holland's. Both agreed that Exxon, through its testimony and
arguments, led the jury to believe that it was a "good corporate
citizen."' 7 In actuality, however, "Exxon and its attorneys withheld
evidence of the agreements with the Seattle Seven that would have the
effect of nullifying the jury verdict pro tanto."'5 8 Professor Hazard
believed that the only purpose in withholding evidence of the

151. MODEL RULES, supra note 148, Rule 3.3. &
152. Though the court did not believe that either Lee Raymond or Exxon's trial counsel
had knowledge of the details of the Seattle Seven agreement, the court stated that "at least one of
the attorneys who represented Exxon had knowledge of the terms of the agreement." Order No.
327, supra note 23, at 7.
153. See Order No. 317, supra note 25, and Order No. 327, supra note 23.
154. Hazard Declaration, supra note 33, at 11. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. is Trustee Professor
of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; and Director of the American Law Institute.
He was reporter and chief draftsman for the American Bar Association Rules of Professional
Conduct; consultant and chief draftsman for the American Bar Association Code of Judicial
Conduct; and consultant for the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility.
155. ALASKA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.2(d) (1993).
156. ALASKA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 8.4 (1993).
157. See Hazard Declaration, supra note 33, at 11.
158. Id.at 11.
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agreement was to mislead the court and jury.5 9 In Professor Hazard's opinion, Exxon's deception constituted a violation of the
professional duties owed to the tribunal.16
As earlier stated, Exxon's numerous affiants completely ignored
the district court's findings that Exxon had affirmatively misrepresented to the court and jury the terms of the Exxon/Seattle Seven
agreements.
They argued simply that neither the agreements
themselves nor the nondisclosure of the agreements were against public
policy and, therefore, that they did not violate any ethical canons or
rules.' 61 As Mr. Webster contended, "If the pretrial settlement
could be said to offend public policy, the vice must lie in the opportunity for mischief during trial resulting from such an agreement. None
appears to be present here.' 1 62 Professor Wolfram likewise maintained
that, "[the] Seattle Seven's agreements to cede back its award of
punitive damages to Exxon in no way impeded or distorted the
'
presentation of evidence to the jury at the Phase III trial."163
Only after the conclusion of the trial did Exxon admit that
misrepresentations were made. Even then, Exxon argued that those
misrepresentations were inadvertent and therefore did not violate public
policy. 6'
Exxon explained that Mr. Raymond and Exxon's trial
counsel misspoke when they stated that Exxon had received only
receipts. 165 But those statements were not literally true; Exxon did
receive some releases. 66 What counsel should have said is, "[a]nd
you know what, for the most part we never asked for a release." ' 67
Plaintiffs now argue that the court's finding concerning the
misrepresentations made by Exxon should be given deference. 6 Not
only had Judge Holland heard the testimony in court, he had presided
over the matter for seven years and had extensive experience with the
parties and the design of the trial.169 Based on his experience, "Judge

159. Id. at 11-12.
160. Id. at 11.
161. See, e.g., Webster Declaration, supra note 144, at 7.
162. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
163. Declaration of Charles W. Wolfram at 7, In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095-CV
(HRH) (D. Alaska declaration filed July 11, 1996) (on file with the Seattle University Law
Review).
164. See Appellants' Brief, supra note 10, at 36.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id. Exxon's Counsel actually said in dosing arguments, "And you know what, we
never asked for a release." Id.
168. See Appellees' Brief, supra note 2, at 51.
169. See id. at 52.
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Holland knew 7°that Exxon had misled not only the jury, but had misled
'
him as well. '
2.

The Exxon/Seattle Seven Agreements Violate Public Policy
Encouraging Settlement

Exxon portrayed its agreements with the Seattle Seven as a noble
effort to serve the public policy of encouraging settlement. It asserted
that partial settlements should be encouraged because they reduce the
171
size of the litigation and often lead to a complete settlement.
Exxon's argument, however, ignored the facts of the Exxon/Seattle
Seven agreements. The agreement did not promote settlement or
reduce the size of the litigation, but rather promoted additional
litigation by requiring that the Seattle Seven object to the Plan of
Allocation and pursue punitive damages on Exxon's behalf. Despite
having "settled," the Seattle Seven stood ready to jump back into the
litigation whenever Exxon so desired. Moreover, Exxon's settlement
agreement prevented settlement with the remaining plaintiffs because
in order to accomplish the goal of its agreement litigation had to be
pursued.
Exxon additionally argued that Judge Holland's refusal to honor
its agreements was contrary to public policy because it discourages and
prevents settlement in mass tort litigation. 1 72 Judge Holland was
quick to dispute this assertion, however, holding that "[h]onest
settlements will always expedite resolution of mass tort litigation;
dishonest ones, such as the ones at issue here, however, will be
rejected."' 73
Courts Must Require Disclosure of Novel Mary Carter Agreements
Recognizing the potential for abuse, the majority of courts have
required that Mary Carter agreements be disclosed to the court before
trial. 74 Ordinarily, settlement agreements between a plaintiff and
defendant are excluded from the jury because of the concern that juries
may consider settlements an admission of liability or may inappropriately adjust jury awards.' 75 Mary Carter agreements have become an
exception to the rule because, if left undisclosed, the settlement
B.

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
See Appellants' Brief, supra note 10, at 27.
See Order No. 317, supra note 25, at 31 n.45.
Id. at 31.
See Cox v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 594 P.2d at 359.
See FED. R. EVID. 408.
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arrangement is likely to adversely affect the proceedings and outcome
of the trial.176
Exxon argued that the Exxon/Seattle Seven agreements should not
have been disclosed to the court because of the public policies
protecting the confidentiality of settlement agreements.17 7 It further
relied on the declarations submitted with its motion to reconsider
Order No. 317.178 Exxon's argument, however, failed to consider
two critical facts: "(1) in this case, Exxon did disclose the existence of
settlement agreements and (2) in doing so, Exxon misrepresented the
179
terms of the relevant agreement.'
According to Order No. 327, Judge Holland did not dispute
Exxon's arguments concerning public policies encouraging settlements
or keeping them confidential, but focused on the fact that Exxon
disclosed part of the agreements. 8 0 As the court explained, "Exxon
disclosed part of the agreement; and in making that disclosure, Exxon
misrepresented the part of the agreement which was crucial to the
punitive damages issue. Having failed to tell the whole story, Exxon
perpetrated a fraud upon the court and jury."''
Because the agreements were misrepresented and later disclosed,
Judge Holland did not reach the issue of whether the Exxon/Seattle
Seven agreements should have been disclosed to the court absent a
misrepresentation. This Note concludes that, as in Mary Carter
agreements, courts must require pretrial disclosure of novel agreements
like the Exxon/Seattle Seven agreements to prevent parties from
deceiving courts and undercutting the jury system. As in Mary Carter
agreements, the danger of deception in the Exxon/Seattle Seven
agreements arises from the secrecy of the agreements combined with
the realignment of the parties' interests in the outcome of the case.
Such agreements pose a serious threat to the adversarial process, as well
as to the rights of the nonsettling parties. In Exxon's case, the
withholding of the agreement further provided Exxon an opportunity

176. See Benedict, supra note 75, at 383.
177. See Appellants' Brief, supra note 10, at 40.
178. See id. See also Declaration of Griffin B. Bell at 4 In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095CV (HRH) (D. Alaska declaration filed July 15, 1996) (on file with the Seattle University Law
Review) ("I am not aware of any ethical obligation to advise a jury in advance of its verdict as to
the terms of pre-existing settlements. In fact, the law is to the contrary and generally militates
against disclosing settlements to a jury so that the jury can decide the issue cleanly, without
angling to affect or undo a settlement."); Appellees' Brief, supra note 2, at 52.
179. Appellees' Brief, supra note 2, at 52.
180. Id. at 53.
181. Order No. 327, supra note 23, at 11.
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to promote unethical collusion, prolong the litigation, and mislead the
court and jury.
In order to preserve the integrity of the adversarial system, such
settlements must be disclosed to the court. Disclosure will prevent
parties from taking unfair technical advantage of nonsettling parties,
reveal the true interests of the parties to the jury, and prevent
misrepresentation of the contents of the agreements to the court and
jury. By requiring pre-trial disclosure of such agreements, courts can
determine how best to limit the prejudicial effects of the agreements,
while preserving the right of the defendant to settle with any plaintiff.
By removing the veil of secrecy from novel Mary Carter agreements, signatories to the agreements will be prevented from skewing
the trial process and misleading courts and juries. Because the danger
of deception is greatly diminished when disclosure of such agreements
is made to the court, it is probably unnecessary to declare such
agreements void altogether. Despite the presence of novel Mary Carter
agreements, courts will be able to preserve judicial integrity through
the implementation of reasonable procedural safeguards.
CONCLUSION

The Exxon/Seattle Seven settlement agreements are novel because
a compulsory punitive damages class, such as the one at issue, is
novel.' 82 As compulsory punitive damages classes become more
prevalent, however, so will novel forms of settlement agreements.
Although Judge Holland reached the correct decision in refusing to
allow Exxon to profit from its misrepresentation, he should have done
more to prevent the mischief that future copy-cat agreements may
bring.
By stating his approval of Exxon's craftiness, Judge Holland has
endorsed a dangerous precedent. Exxon's novel Mary Carter agreement is not a new settlement device but a technique to subvert the
adversarial process. As such, agreements like the one between Exxon
and the Seattle Seven should be treated as Mary Carter agreements and
be required to be disclosed to the court.

182. See Declaration of Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach at 3, In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095CV (HRHI) (D. Alaska declaration filed July 15, 1996) (on file with the Seattle University Law
Review).

